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Explorando a burocracia de médio escalão: 
uma tentativa de tipologia
Introduction
The paper’s main goal is to present an original typology of bureau-
crats, situated in the intermediate layer of the civil service structure. 
This specific set of players, the mid-level bureaucrat (MLB), is seen 
as a strategic group, primarily, because of its connection role and 
position between the top officials and the policy executors. A deeper 
understanding about this group is central in order to contribute 
both for the incipient literature on the subject as for the empirical 
knowledge of the Brazilian public administration.
The literature has already pointed out the importance of MLB 
in policymaking, as they play an important role in establishing and 
operating different kinds of relationships, in regulating commu-
nication and information and also in connecting the formulation 
and implementation processes (Pires, 2015; Huising and Silbey, 
2011; Keiser, 2010; Mintzberg, 1973; Cavalcante e Lotta, 2015). At 
the same time, the literature also shows that they are composed 
by heterogeneous groups. MLBs are also different in a variety of 
forms - profile, experience, way of working, among others, which 
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are normally influenced by a comprehensive range of factors. As 
Cavalcante and Lotta (2015, p 302) point out: “(...) the comple-
xity, characteristics and natures of the policies and organizations 
generate different forms of actions and performances of the MLBs 
and in order to understand this particular player it is also essential 
to analyze the institutional environment they operate in.”
Bureaucrats heterogeneity is one of the most recurring subjects 
in the literature, specially, because it helps to comprehend who they 
are and how they perform, including internal or external interac-
tion, degree of discretion, scope and technical nature of their deci-
sions, isolation or exposure to political issues, etc. The differences 
between the MLBs regarding the roles and functions they play in 
policymaking are also highlighted. For instance, Mintzberg (1973) 
argues that, due to the managers’ performance diversity, they could 
be framed in three general categories of functions: interpersonal, 
informational and decisory. Besides, these bureaucrats perform, at 
the same time, technical and managerial activities combined with 
political activities, i.e., translating strategic decisions in policies 
(Pires, 2011). It is precisely this capacity of merging technical and 
political skills and the position in the organizational structure that 
are the key factors that make mid-level bureaucrats influential 
during the processes of policy decision-making (Currie and Procter, 
2005; Kelly and Gennard, 2007).
As we will discuss further, despite their relevance and well-k-
nown heterogeneity, few studies have explored this diversity and the 
effects in the policymaking. Nevertheless, some of these researches 
combine theoretical and empirical efforts in order to investigate 
civil servants heterogeneity. First, scholars have been primarily 
concerned with hierarchy, focusing analysis on specific groups of 
bureaucrats, such as the street level (Lipsky, 1980) or the top rank 
officials (De Bonis, 2008; Dror, 1996; Longo, 2007). Second, analyses 
of their motivations and behaviors have also been used to compare 
bureaucrats (Downs, 1967; Schneider, 1994). In the same sense, 
important inquiries have investigated comparatively the bureau-
crats’ effects on economic development and on  policymaking. For 
Exploring mid-level bureaucracy: a tentative typology 189
instance, Evans and Rauch (2014) research of the Weberian states 
and researches that use merit and capacity indexes to create typolo-
gies of Latin American public servants (IADB, 2006).
None of them, however, specifically applies to MLBs, which 
converges with Lotta, Pires and Oliveira (2015) that, based on exten-
sive research of international literature, outline a great number of 
gaps that still need to be overcome by empirical studies. 
In this context, this research addresses the following questions. 
Are the mid-level bureaucrats heterogeneous? If so, how? Is it 
possible to map different subgroups among MLBs? Which dimen-
sions differ the most among them? In order to answer these ques-
tions and  help  fulfilling this knowledge gap, this paper proposes 
a typology that includes crucial dimensions, such as profile, back-
ground and performance.
Therefore, survey data collected in 2014 from federal mid-level 
bureaucrats with commissioned positions was employed, known 
as DAS, 1-5. It is worth explaining that in the structure of commis-
sioned positions in the Brazilian federal government, there are six 
positions denominated DAS (Management Positions or Higher 
Advisory), ranging from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest) and NE (Special 
Nature Positions) superior to DAS 6. Considering this structure, the 
positions can be defined as: servers without DAS: low-level; DAS 
1 to 5:  mid-level (subject of this research); and 6 and NE: high-
-level. The sample, over seven thousands respondents, was quite 
significant, about 30% of the population, and also representative of 
different segments (ENAP, 2014).
In addition to the simple variables, it was also formulated 
synthetic indicators to measure the bureaucrats’ degree of rela-
tionship and activities (Index of MLB Relationships – IBR and Index 
of MLB Activities – IBA). Then, a cluster analysis was employed to 
identify similar groups and build an exploratory MLB typology. 
Therefore,  the complete-linkage clustering (farthest neighbor) was 
employed, which focuses at grouping together successive sets of 
variables or individuals until the similarity measure between them 
starts to decrease (Johnson and Wichern, 2007).
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The empirical results were quite interesting. The cluster analysis 
provided five distinguished types that were used to classify and 
discuss the MLB groups with an illustrative reference to the hierar-
chical structure of the social classes in the European Feudalism 
period. The typology demonstrated the existence of an elite of 
mid-level bureaucrats, such as nobles, vassals and knights. However, 
even inside this prominent segment there is hierarchy. Considering 
the performance dimensions (influence, relationship and activities), 
nobles are at the top, followed by vassals and knights, in this parti-
cular order. The pyramid basis, composed by two types - merchants 
and farmers - is very far from the elite, mainly because they have, 
overall, less qualification and resources. 
Following this introduction, the second section discusses the 
existing bureaucrats’ typologies. Next, the methods and variables 
of the empirical analysis are presented. Then, the mid-level bureau-
crats’ types and characteristics are discussed. Finally, some conclu-
sions are debated.  
Bureaucrats’ Typologies
In recent years, there has been an increase of studies towards 
the comprehension of the civil servant, both in terms of its role and 
profile. Although the literature has achieved important findings 
understanding how bureaucrats work, there is still a gap regarding 
the types of existing and active bureaucrats in different govern-
ments. At the same time, although the literature already demons-
trates that bureaucrats are heterogeneous and take part on diverse 
groups and even propose some kinds of typologies, there is barely 
any progress in understanding specific groups of bureaucrats in a 
more comprehensively way, specially the MLBs. 
It can be argued here that the typologies available in the literature 
only consider few aspects, such as structure or sectors, but still lacks 
the different aspects about profile, hierarchy and performance. The 
idea of a tentative typology of mid-level civil servants addresses this 
gap and aggregate dimensions that highlight their characteristics in 
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order to corroborate the discussions about the implications of these 
differences for the policymaking.
Therefore, the analytical foundations must consider the existing 
diversity not just in terms of profile, but, above all, regarding 
their hierarchical position, performance, responsibilities and rela-
tionships during the policymaking process. 
In this section, the typologies available in the bureaucracy’s 
literature is discussed in order to demonstrate the relevance of this 
investigation strategy  in the field of study.
A first taxonomy focuses on the hierarchical position. The diffe-
rence between high-level, mid-level and more operational level 
bureaucracies is present in the literature since its beginnings, asso-
ciating hierarchy and functional structure elements with degree of 
responsibility and politicization. In this typology, bureaucrats are 
sorted accordingly to their functions in the policymaking process, 
i.e., formulation and implementation stages.
Top officials, also called the high level bureaucracy, in general, 
work directly associated with the formulation phase and the poli-
tical sphere, thus their performance tends to be more political 
(Loureiro et al., 2010). Part of the literature also associates this layer 
of the bureaucracy to the idea of public officials, as they assume 
managerial positions that lead or manage the decisions of other 
strata of bureaucracy (De Bonis, 2008; Dror, 1996; Longo, 2007). 
With regards to high-level, scholars have investigated how the 
appointment process (recruitment and selection) operates, espe-
cially considering systems in which the occupation of senior roles is 
restricted to commissioned positions, highly influenced by political 
aspects. For instance, the research of Lopez et al. (2014)  deepen 
the understanding of the bureaucrat’s appointment processes in 
the Brazilian federal government, covering their political and 
partisan ties, tenure and turnover, technical knowledge or political 
connection.
The mid-level bureaucracy consists of a large set of heteroge-
neous individuals occupying intermediate positions in the admi-
nistration. Establishing a relationship between the top (high-level) 
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and operational base of organizations, MLBs have their overall 
performance linked to the idea of translation between political and 
technical dimensions. Besides, scholars have sought to understand 
aspects related to the organizational locus and values, types of 
activity, leadership, relationships, etc (Lotta, Pires, Oliveira, 2014). 
This literature has two recurrent themes. The first concerns the rela-
tionships established by them -  a vertical (relations with bosses and 
subordinates) and horizontal logic (interaction with intra and inter 
peers) (Pires, 2015). The second issue relates to understanding how, 
from their relational activities, these players regulate the interaction 
between different areas of the organization and between different 
organizations (Huising and Silvey, 2011).
The operational bureaucracy, usually linked to the policy imple-
mentation phase, also involves a more structured set of studies 
aimed to understand the actions of those who directly perform 
services to citizens, the so-called street-level bureaucrats. However, 
the literature has devoted little attention to the bureaucrats in the 
“backstage”, in other words, the low-level bureaucracy without 
commissioned positions and no direct contact with citizens (Hoyler 
and Campos, 2016). On the contrary, the bulk of the studies has 
emphasized how street-level bureaucracy makes its decisions, inte-
racts with citizens, how their values interfere on their discretion, 
managerial and organizational factors that affect their operations, 
networks and relationships (Hupe at al., 2015; Maynard and 
Musheno, 2003; Lotta, 2015; Spinelli, 2016; Pires, 2009). More 
recent inquiries have focused on understanding factors such as the 
accountability of these bureaucrats, a direct reference to the idea of 
the legitimacy in decision-making process (Hupe, 2007) and inclu-
sive or exclusive dimension of their work (Dubois, 1999; Maynard 
and Musheno, 2003).
Therefore, this classical typology seeks to understand the bureau-
cracy from different hierarchical layers and has brought important 
insights to the literature, but still lacks researches on the internal 
heterogeneity and how the differences across different bureaucrats 
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levels are determined by relevant dimensions such as policy sector, 
politicization, behavior or organizational values.
Other taxonomy involves the chain of command, that is, who 
decides and who performs. Some scholars analyze the bureau-
cracy role, grounded  in the logic of the principal-agent model, 
considering agents as those obeying the commands determined 
by the principals. In other words, it is not an established typology, 
nevertheless, it allows us to understand the existing informational 
gaps in the operative chain. In this model, the agent generally has a 
level of information about policy issues higher than the principal, 
especially because the latter is not directly involved in the details of 
policymaking. The principal, in turn, knows the agents’ utility curve 
and can provide incentives for them to perform better. Conse-
quently, this informational asymmetry is as interesting reference 
to differentiate the performance among bureaucratic agents and 
principals (Waterman and Wood, 1993).
Other set of typologies in the field of study investigates the diffe-
rence of the bureaucrats focusing on their preferences, motivations 
and interests in the public sector.
One of them is the Anthony Downs (1967) research that differen-
tiates bureaucrats by their behaviors. Grounded on Public Choice 
theory, the author assumes that bureaucracy pursues rationally 
their goals and its utility maximizers. These agents, at the same time, 
have multiple objectives, such as power, income, security, prestige, 
excellence at work and pride for serving the public, among others. 
These individual motivations are also constrained by contextual 
elements, which stimulate certain behaviors and can generate access 
to certain information differently among agents. Based on this 
diversity of interests and motivation, Downs (1967) establishes a 
typology of five bureaucratic groups.
The first one, so-called climbers, are purely self-interested agents 
that also value power, income and prestige. They seek promotion 
to higher hierarchical positions or jobs in other organizations 
linked to income and prestige. The second group, conservers, seeks 
to maximize security and convenience, clinging to all that they 
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have earned as income and power. They avoid change and, hence, 
become attached to rules and procedures. The advocates are loyal 
to the organization functions or the organization as a whole and 
seek power to influence policies and actions (Oliveira, 2007). Their 
goal is to increase the support and resources in order to strengthen 
their policies. The fourth group, the zealots, has political loyalty 
or narrow and specific concepts and look for power in order to 
satisfy their beliefs, to which they concentrate energy and resources 
(Oliveira, 2007). They try to overcome the obstacles and attack the 
status quo, pursuing changes to policies. Lastly, the statesmen are 
committed to the society as a whole and believes in the pursuit of 
the “public interest”. Therefore, they perform trying to influence 
policy at the national level. These bureaucrats defend the expansion 
of non-partisan political way and try to isolate the administrative 
activities (Oliveira, 2007).
Downs (1967) points out that, although the typology shows 
different motivations and interests, it is not inert. Bureaucrats can 
change their behavior over time, from one type to another, or by 
changes in their motivations, either by changes of context.
Ben Schneider (1994) formulated another important study 
concerning public servants’ motivations and behaviors. By analyzing 
different cases of industrial policies in Brazil, the author discusses 
the preferences of bureaucrats and their relationship with others 
interests in politics. As results, bureaucrats map, along their career, 
different goals - some more personal, others directed to policies. 
Thus, Schneider (1994) reaches four types of careers in the case 
analyzed: military, political, technical and technic-political. As they 
cannot achieve all the objectives at the same time, the bureaucrats 
make strategic choices, which are the careers calculations (Oliveira, 
2007) and understanding these different career paths helps to know 
the bureaucracy’s preferences.
Although these behavioral approaches enriches the analysis of 
the bureaucracy, they still lack a more  interdependent understan-
ding regarding the type and nature of policymaking involved and 
the responsibilities assumed by the bureaucrats in their daily work.
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In this regard, another set of interesting typologies focus on diffe-
rentiating the bureaucrats from the organizational locus or nature 
of the policies in which they operate. In studies of management and 
especially in organizational studies, for example, it is common to 
find a distinction between the bureaucrats of the middle areas or 
executive areas - considering that the former are more concerned 
with administrative activities, with little interaction with final users 
or external public; while the latter focuses at carrying out the policies 
and interacting more directly with the external public. Another 
typology relates to the sectors where these bureaucrats act: social 
, economic, infrastructure, government sector, etc. Recent studies 
show that there are important disparities in the bureaucrats’ profile 
and performance considering the sectoral differences (Cavalcante 
at al., 2015). The same logic applies to the bureaucracy types based 
on the nature of the policies in which they work (regulatory, distri-
butive and redistributive). Although this  field of study is barely 
explored, there are demonstrations that different policy natures 
are associated with different types of bureaucracies, especially with 
regard to their duties and responsibilities (Brehm and Gates, 1997).
Also with respect to political and bureaucratic dimensions, an 
important study of Evans and Rauch (2014) helps to understand 
the relation between bureaucracy’s types and economic develop-
ment. Focused on different characteristics of the state economic 
institutions in emerging countries between 1970-1990, the authors 
apply the so-called “Weberian Scale” in order to evaluate the degree 
of implementation of “Weberian” actions in these countries and to 
which extent they contribute to the economic growth measured by 
GDP per capita and human capital.
Starting from the thesis that the degree of bureaucratization, in 
the Weberian sense of the term, is a dimension of the countries’ 
growth, the authors analyze “the degree to which the central state 
agencies are characterized by meritocratic recruitment and offer 
structured career progression and bonus performance” (Evans and 
Rauch, 2014, p. 411). From the empirical analysis and comparing 
the Weberian scale in several countries, the authors demonstrate 
Pedro L. C. Cavalcante, Gabriela S. Lotta e Erika M. K. Yamada196
that the relationship between the scale and economic growth is 
strong and significant, so that the scale has a powerful impact on 
economic growth.
This evidence, as the authors argue, “reinforces the proposition 
that state bureaucracies characterized by meritocratic recruitment 
and predictable and rewarding careers are associated with higher 
growth rates” (p. 429). Thus, the analysis of the Weberian State 
variables  helps to characterize the different states and the role of 
the bureaucracy and can, therefore, be an analytical tool to the 
composition of a bureaucrat’s typology.
A similar analytical approach was adopted by the Inter-Ame-
rican Development Bank’s publication The Politics of Policy (IADB, 
2006). Assuming that bureaucracy is one of the institutional foun-
dations for effective functioning in the democratic system, the 
report analyzes different indicators of strength and institutiona-
lization bureaucracy in governments. The central idea is that the 
weakness or strength of the bureaucracy strongly contributes to the 
policy results in Latin American nations. Bureaucratic weakness 
is one of the causes for the historically ineffective development of 
these countries. 
Bureaucracy is responsible for different roles in decision-making 
and the more neutral and professional their operations, the greater 
the guarantee of stability, adaptability and public interest goal in 
policies. Based on these assumptions, the report proposes a set of 
qualitative and quantitative tools to examine “the extent to which 
bureaucracies are endowed with the institutional attributes required 
to perform the regulatory roles assigned to them in a representative 
democracy” (IADB, 2006, p. 65).
The study has been developed by comparing 18 countries in the 
region. One of the measures adopted was the degree of autonomy 
of the bureaucracy, which evaluates the degree to which effective 
guarantees of professionalism in the civil service are in place and 
the degree to which civil servants are effectively protected from 
arbitrariness, politicization, and rent-seeking (IADB, 2006).
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The analysis shows that there are three groups of countries, 
separated according to their performance on the indicator. The first 
one (of which Brazil is a part) shows a widespread acceptance of the 
principles of merit in decisions regarding the hiring, promotion, 
and dismissal of public officials”. The second group has “practices 
based on merit coexist with traditions of political patronage. The 
third group reflects strong politicization of decisions on hiring, 
promotion, and dismissal (IADB, 2006).  
The second indicator, the functional capacity index, covers the 
ability of bureaucracies to formulate and implement public policies, 
considering their technical capabilities and appropriate incentives 
for effective performance. Therefore, the indicator measures charac-
teristics such as salary compensation system and evaluation system 
of the servant’s performance.
From the intersection between the two indicators, the report 
groups the countries of Latin America in three different degrees of 
bureaucratic development.
The first group has bureaucracies with minimum development, 
in which the civil service system cannot guarantee the attraction 
and retention of competent personnel, and lacks the managerial 
mechanisms necessary to promote efficient performance on the 
part of civil servants. The second group shows the countries where 
public service systems are fairly well structured but that have not 
been consolidated in terms of merit guarantees and management 
tools that would allow for an effective utilization of its capabili-
ties (IADB, 2006). The third and final group, in which Brazil is 
located, is composed of countries with a high degree of institutio-
nalization - comparatively - despite having systems with different 
characteristics.
Finally, the quality indicator of the bureaucracy is constructed 
from a combination of metric indices and functional capacity with 
an efficiency indicator that measures the percentage of the total 
employed population in the public service. The result of this combi-
nation is a typology of bureaucratic types to formulate, organized 
into four different types:
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1) Administrative bureaucracy: It is characterized by a low 
capacity and high relative degree of autonomy. For the 
authors, it is usually related to a partial or failed attempt to 
develop a traditional Weberian bureaucracy. Civil servants 
are hired based more on political than meritocratic criteria, 
but they have some job security. The degree of their technical 
competence and orientation toward good performance is low 
(IADB, 2006). This bureaucracy has, therefore, limited abili-
ties to act in a more active and influential way in the decision 
making process of public policies, whose decisions are gene-
rally associated with the ministers. It is the bureaucracy with a 
more focused role in the implementation of policies, although 
with a tendency to formalism and control procedures and not 
the effectiveness of policies. 
2) Clientelistic Bureaucracy: This group is characterized by low 
autonomy and low capacity. It is based on a high turnover 
of positions associated strongly to political loyalty or party 
affiliation. This rotation, in turn, affects the stock of human 
resources of the State. The role of these bureaucracies to 
formulate is related to their nature primarily as a political 
resource of the governing party to exchange jobs for votes 
or political support. This type of bureaucracy is an extension 
of the political party. There are potential conflicts with other 
professional and meritocratic segments of bureaucracies to 
formulate, competing for their ideas and roles in the design 
of policies.
3) Parallel bureaucracy (“technical teams” or “project teams”): 
typology based on the low autonomy and high capacity. 
Bureaucracies are formed in a job system logic, based on 
hiring committed managers by flexible contracts. Therefore, 
those contracted are not part of the permanent structure and 
can be renewed constantly. The central feature is not party 
affiliation but specific knowledge and recognized in certain 
policy areas (logic of “technopolitical”). They find relative 
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degrees of resistance from other bureaucratic actors and their 
success varies from case to case. 
4) Meritocratic bureaucracy. Type formed by a high degree of 
autonomy and high capacity with different combinations. 
Bureaucracies are composed of stable civil servants recruited 
based on merit and incorporated into the state careers. 
May have incentive systems based on its own merits and 
capabilities.
The authors argue that the countries in Latin America are very 
heterogeneous and composed of different organizations marked by 
distinctive characteristics, namely the heterogeneity, also reflected 
internally in states. This differentiation and typology, however, 
helps to advance the understanding of development levels and 
capacity of the bureaucracies.
Mid-level bureaucrats: a tentative typology
Variables and Methods
One important assumption in the literature is that mid-level 
bureaucrats are heterogeneous, considering a vast range of dimen-
sions, such as profile, professional background and performance, 
among others. Based on that,  the survey data collected in 2014 
from Brazilian federal mid-level bureaucrats with commissioned 
positions was explored, known as DAS 1-5, to create a typology. As 
mentioned before, the sample covers over seven thousands respon-
dents, approximately 30% of the MLBs’ population, and it’s also 
highly representative in different perspectives (ENAP, 2014).
In order to achieve the paper’s purpose, a set of variables was 
selected, including simple and synthetic or composite ones, all 
provided by the survey above-mentioned. Then, the data was 
divided in four dimensions: profile, job attachment, professional 
background and performance. The choice for the first dimension 
stems from the relative consensus in organizational field of study 
that age and educational level may differentiate employees’ motiva-
tion and capability. The options for job attachment and professional 
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background are justified in the bureaucrats’ literature concer-
ning Weberian aspects of autonomy and meritocracy (Evans and 
Rauch, 2014; Cavalcante and Lotta, 2015; Lopez, 2015). Lastly, the 
performance dimension is depicted by three variables: relationship, 
influence and activities.
As the literature argues, the relational dimension of MLBs is 
important to explain their performance, position and interactions. 
At the same time, this dimension is the one that differentiates the 
MLBs from the other levels of civil servants in the policymaking 
process, as they take responsibility and locus for establishing rela-
tionships between different kinds of actors (Kuratko et al, 2005; 
Keiser, 2010). This literature also demonstrates that MLBs perform 
operating two different axis of relationships: the horizontal one 
(with peers) and the vertical one (with superiors and subordinates) 
(Pires, 2015) and, therefore, they become gatekeepers of informa-
tion, communication and relationships. This is the idea that MLB 
act on regulatingrelationships and also managing the gaps between 
rules and practices (Huising and Silbey, 2011; Keiser, 2010). Besides, 
MLBs have, or develop, an ability to influence decisions. This 
capacity, however depends on the combination of technical and 
specialization and management skills (Kelly and Gennard, 2007); 
hierarchical position; level of conflict with different professionals 
(Currie and Procter, 2005); and sensitivity to understand the stra-
tegic context of the organization (Kuratko et al., 2005). As pointed 
out before, by analyzing the different kinds of MLB performance, 
Mintzberg (1973) points out that there can be categorized 3 diffe-
rent functions performed by them: interpersonal, informational 
and decisional. 
Regarding the profile, civil servants age and educational level, 
ranging from elementary to doctorate, are included. Four variables 
describe different aspects of job attachment. First, if the MLB works 
in the Federal District (FD). Second, whether career or non-career 
civil servants occupy the commissioned position. Moreover, job 
attachment is also analyzed by hierarchical levels and advisory or 
executive functions.  Chart 1 sets out details of the hierarchical 
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levels of these posts as well as the most common functions asso-
ciated to them.  
Chart 1. Hierarchic levels and functions of DAS posts in the Federal Government
Hierarchical Functions
Executive Advisory
DAS  5 
Minister’s Chief of Staff Minister’s Special Advisor
Head of Department 
Legal Advisor
 Internal Control Secretary 
Undersecretary for Administration 
DAS  4  General Coordinator Advisor
DAS  3 Coordinator Technical Advisor
DAS  2 Head of Division Assistant
DAS  1 Head of a Section Technical Assistant
Source: Brazil (2015).
The professional background is calculated by two continuous 
variables: years of work and years as a team manager in the federal 
government. 
Regarding performance dimension, as discussed previously, the 
capacity to influence decision making processes is highlighted as a 
core feature of the MLB literature. Scholars agree that the combi-
nation of technical and specialized insertion and management 
skills, position in the organizational structure, level of conflict 
with the professionals that are responsible for daily operations 
and sensitivity to understand the strategic context of the organi-
zation are determinant for the mid-level bureaucrats’ influential 
performance (Currie and Procter, 2005; Kuratko et al., 2005; Kelly 
and Gennard, 2007). So, to capture this characteristic the survey 
answer for the following question was employed: “my ideas were 
considered in the process of decision making at the institution that I 
work”. The frequency scale (“1” to “5” and “99” referring to the “not 
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applicable”) was recategorized as “99 = not applicable”, “1 = Never, 
“2 = Rarely” and “3 = Sometimes” for the new category” little/no 
frequency”; “4 = Often” and “5 = Always” have been added in “high 
frequency” category. 
Relationship is also an essential attribute to understand MLB’s 
performance from the relations established with superiors, subor-
dinates or other players involved in policymaking. Normally, to 
become effective, they connect the formulation process to the execu-
tion, or even make the translation among political and technical 
elements involved in public policies (Keiser, 2010; Johansson, 2012; 
Lotta, Pires and Oliveira, 2015). To cover this variable, a composite 
indicator was formulated, the Index of MLB Relationships (IBR), 
detailed in the paper’s appendix 1. IRB is grounded on the following 
question: thinking about the work routine of your current position 
(consider the last year), indicate how often you interact (negotiate, 
send and receive orders, resolve, request information, etc.) with others. 
Finally, the mid-level bureaucrats’ performances have been 
analyzed by the diversity of their activities, including not only inter-
personal contact and dialogue, but also related to other general 
categories, such as informational and decisional ones (Mintzberg, 
1973; Chareanpunsirikul and Wood, 2002; Vie, 2010). To depict this 
characteristic, another composite indicator was formulated, Index 
of MLB Activities (IBA), also detailed in the paper’s appendix 1. 
IRA is based on the following question: “thinking about your work 
routine in this current position (consider the last 12 months), indicate 
how often you perform the following activities”. 
In short, the variables used in the analysis were:
• IBR index (between 0 and 1);
• IBA index (between 0 and 1);
• DAS level (1 to 5);
• Advisor (yes or no);
• Career (non-career civil servant or career civil servant);
• Work in Federal District (yes or no);
• Years of working in the federal government (years);
• Years of management in the federal government (years);
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• Influence (yes or no);
• Age (years);
• Education (Elementary School, High School/Technical 
Education, Bachelor, Specialization, Master and Doctorate). 
Then, a cluster analysis was employed in order to identify similar 
groups and to propose the MLB’s typology. Therefore, the comple-
te-linkage clustering (farthest neighbor) was employed, which aims 
at grouping together successive sets of variables or individuals until 
the distance between them starts to decrease (Johnson and Wichern, 
2007). This method ensures that all observations in a cluster are 
within a maximum distance, and tends to produce clusters with 
similar diameters. In a previous step, Gower’s coefficients were 
calculated (Gower, 1971) to establish the dissimilarity matrix 
(appendix 2). Note that this coefficient was used to jointly analyze 
qualitative and quantitative variables. As a result, the cophenetic 
correlation coefficient was 0.61, which measures the degree of fit 
between the original similarity matrix and the simplified matrix 
provided by the clustering method, thus, five groups can be identi-
fied, as described below.
Results
Table 1 presents the relative frequency of each variable within 
their respective groups or types of mid-level bureaucrats. The 
percentage refers to the ratio between the number of MLBs having 
certain characteristic (for example, occupying a DAS 1) and the 
total MLBs in the group. 
Table 1. Groups and General Descriptions
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 General
DAS       
1 180 (10.2%)
250 
(21.84%)
333 
(36.12%)
161 
(36.35%)
1004 (35.82%) 1928 (27.24%)
2 301 (17.06%)
204 
(17.82%)
189 (20.5%)
126 
(28.45%)
860 (30.69%) 1680 (23.74%)
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3 416 (23.57%)
250 
(21.84%)
192 
(20.83%)
95 (21.45%) 590 (21.05%) 1543 (21.8%)
4 577 (32.7%)
353 
(30.83%)
146 
(15.84%)
47 (10.61%) 292 (10.42%) 1415 (20%)
5 291 (16.49%) 88 (7.69%) 62 (6.73%) 14 (3.17%) 57 (2.04%) 512 (7.24%)
Advisor?       
No 1273 (72.13%)
456 
(39.83%)
797 
(86.45%)
0 (0%) 2803 (100%) 5329 (75.29%)
Yes 492 (27.88%)
689 
(60.18%)
125 
(13.56%)
443 (100%) 0 (0%) 1749 (24.72%)
Career       
Non-career civil servant 509 (28.84%) 0 (0%)
123 
(13.35%)
443 (100%) 635 (22.66%) 1710 (24.16%)
Career civil servants 1256 (71.17%) 1145 (100%)
799 
(86.66%)
0 (0%) 2168 (77.35%) 5368 (75.85%)
Work in the Federal 
District?
      
No 0 (0%) 166 (14.5%) 922 (100%) 95 (21.45%) 1463 (52.2%) 2646 (37.39%)
Yes 1765 (100%)
979 
(85.51%)
0 (0%)
348 
(78.56%)
1340 (47.81%) 4432 (62.62%)
Influential       
No 0 (0%) 1145 (100%) 0 (0%)
413 
(93.23%)
2803 (100%) 4361 (61.62%)
Yes 1765 (100%) 0 (0%) 922 (100%) 30 (6.78%) 0 (0%) 2717 (38.39%)
Education Level       
Elementary School 0 (0%) 2 (0.18%) 1 (0.11%) 1 (0.23%) 7 (0.25%) 11 (0.16%)
High School / Technical 
Education
56 (3.18%) 54 (4.72%) 30 (3.26%) 61 (13.77%) 216 (7.71%) 417 (5.9%)
Bachelor 445 (25.22%)
286 
(24.98%)
254 
(27.55%)
227 
(51.25%)
1062 (37.89%) 2274 (32.13%)
Specialization 771 (43.69%) 466 (40.7%)
346 
(37.53%)
125 
(28.22%)
1081 (38.57%) 2789 (39.41%)
Master’s degree 374 (21.19%)
228 
(19.92%)
173 
(18.77%)
26 (5.87%) 340 (12.13%) 1141 (16.13%)
Doctorate degree 119 (6.75%) 109 (9.52%) 118 (12.8%) 3 (0.68%) 97 (3.47%) 446 (6.31%)
IRB Average 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.52 0.55
IBA Average 0.76 0.68 0.75 0.61 0.65 0.69
Age  Average 42.99 44.96 48.06 40.12 44.88 44.53
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Years of working  in 
the federal gover-
nment (average)
13.64 16.13 17.41 8.55 14.20 14.43
Years as manager  in 
the federal gover-
nment (average)
7.19 7.14 8.57 2.73 6.08 6.64
MLBs 1765 1145 922 443 2803 7078
Source:  Author, based on Mid-level Bureaucrats Surveys.
Before discussing the MLB’s tentative typology,  let’s first describe 
the main features of each group.
Group 1
Group 1 has the second largest number of the MLBs sample, 
the highest IBR (0.61) and IBA (0.76) indexes average. They are all 
influential bureaucrats in the decision-making process. Almost half 
of them occupy DAS 4 (32%) or 5 (16%). The majority work with 
executive functions, 72%, while 28% work as advisors. Virtually, 
the same proportions apply to career (71%) and non-career civil 
servants (29%). These two variables distributions converge with the 
same pattern of the DAS population (Brazil, 2015). All MLBs in the 
group 1 works in the Federal District and over 70% hold a postgra-
duate degree (specialization, master or doctorate). Surprisingly, the 
average working years in the federal public administration is the 
second smallest and so is their age average.
Group 2
This group typically is composed by advisors (60%) with DAS 3 
to 5. In the same proportion, they all belong to a permanent career 
in the civil service. Most of them work in the FD (85%), are well 
educated (70% postgraduate) and have the third highest IRB and 
IBA averages. Lastly, the group has the second highest average age 
and years of working; however, its influential capacity in the deci-
sion-making is low or absent. 
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Group 3
The bulk of bureaucrats in group 3 has executive functions and 
comes from permanent careers in the federal government, both 
variables sit around 86%. They mostly hold lower commissioned 
positions, 78% with DAS 1 to 3, don’t work in the Capital and have 
also a distinguished educational level (69% postgraduate). Regar-
ding performance, group 3 has the second highest average in the 
IRB (0.59) and IBA (0.75) indexes and is influential in decision-ma-
king. These mid-level bureaucrats, on average, are the oldest and the 
most experienced in government and also as team managers.
Group 4
Advisors and non-career civil servants exclusively compose 
group 4. The majority works in the Federal District (78%), occupies 
lower DAS (1 to 3), about 87%, and has, on average, the worst educa-
tional background. Their indexes of relationships and activities are 
also the lowest and just few of them are influential (7%). The MLBs 
from this group are the youngest ones and the least experienced 
both in working and managing in the federal government.
Group 5
The largest group of mid-level bureaucrats, representing 40% of 
the sample. They all work with executive functions and, on average, 
are concentrated in the lowest commissioned positions, 88% from 
DAS 1 to 3. The majority of them takes part of a permanent career, 
nevertheless, almost half works outside the Capital. They have no 
influence on decision-making, displays low IRB and IBA indexes 
and almost 55% have postgraduate degree. Their average of expe-
rience in the federal administration is around 14 years and their age 
about 45 years old.
Analysis
The cluster analysis results demonstrated that even in this specific 
segment of the civil service, a heterogeneity pattern prevail. So, this 
assumption is confirmed and one can move forward to discuss how 
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these dimensions’ diversity can be used to set up a mid-level bureau-
crats’ typology. The two charts below (Figure 1) correlate the most 
important variables employed to explore the MLB heterogeneity.
Figure 1. Performance Dimensions and Hierarchical/Educational Levels
Source: Authors, based on Mid-level Bureaucrats Surveys.
The radar chart displays three performance variables – influen-
ce,relationship and activities indexes that express, under different 
approaches, aspects of the professional’s skills and prominence 
in government. First, the chart reinforces that only two groups of 
MLBs (1 and 3) are actually capable of influencing the decision 
making process. The same groups also have the highest averages of 
IRB and IBA indexes, i.e., they are the most connected and perform 
a more complex list of duties. Despite the fact that group 2 is not 
influential, they have the third best indexes of relationship and 
activities, while group 4 and 5 are quite similar in these matters. 
Previous research has shown that the degree of MLBs rela-
tionship and their activities’ level of complexity tend to increase 
accordingly to their influential capacity and the position they 
occupy (Cavalcante, Lotta and Kasai, 2016). In this sense, one can 
similarly suppose that the highest the DAS, more powerful the 
bureaucrat tends to be. The scatter plot above demonstrates the 
simple correlation between the highest positions (DAS 3 to 5) and 
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the educational level - average of postgraduate in the group. Once 
again the first three groups are better educated than groups 4 and 5. 
On the other hand, the differences among them, regarding the 
posts, are very significant. Group 1, followed by group 2, clearly 
concentrates higher percentage of top DAS, whereas the rest of 
them is situated below or close to 40% of the DAS 3 to 5. It is reaso-
nable to understand groups 4 and 5 in that situation, however, the 
third group, as mentioned before, is more powerful even compared 
to group 2. A possible explanation lies on the fact that MLBs from 
group 3 all work out of the Federal District and most of the decen-
tralized federal units, including agencies, museums, hospitals and 
so on, are, generally, managed by lower DAS. In these cases, despite 
the position level, these bureaucrats are, on average, well quali-
fied and experienced, with a broad network and, consequently, are 
influential and busy.
Hence, to describe each MLB’s types, one has to start referring 
to an analogy of the well-known European social structure in the 
Middle Ages (Burns, 1979). Based on the feudalism social hierarchy, 
the empirical results are translated into types incorporated in the 
mid-level bureaucrats. It is worth mentioning that this is just an 
illustrative exercise to help reinforcing the heterogeneity among the 
MLBs. The purpose is not to systematically compare these diffe-
rent objects, but only to show how the analyzed dimensions of the 
mid-level bureaucrats can also highlight to some extent a degree of 
stratification.
Beyond this segment, in the federal government hierarchy, 
depicted in figure 2, the elected officials are at the top. Back in the 
middle ages, the ‘Church’ has occupied this place, grounded in the 
religion legitimacy. Nowadays, democracy provides the legitimacy 
basis for the elected officials to rule and decide in policymaking. 
In the second level, also not subject of this inquiry, the top officials 
may be considered the most important stakeholders in the bureau-
cratic pyramid, being illustratively compared to the ‘King’ during 
the feudal society. As the elected officials, high-level bureaucrats’ 
appointment, behavior and performance follow a different pattern 
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from the rest of the bureaucrats. Jumping to the triangle base, 
right below the MLBs types, there are the ‘Peasants’ representing 
the low-level and street level bureaucracies.  In the Brazilian case, 
usually, the former works with the MLB but without DAS position, 
while the latter is the one that interacts directly with citizens in 
processes of policy execution (Lipsky, 1980).
In the intermediate segment of the civil service, the groups gene-
rated by the cluster analysis were fitted into the pyramid. In these 
particular layers for the mid-level bureaucrats,  five groups were 
organized in three levels, regarding the dimensions and variables 
employed during the statistical analysis and, especially, the results 
discussed above.
Figure 2. MLB’s Typology and its Middle Ages Analogy
Source: Authors, based on Mid-level Bureaucrats Surveys.
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The typology can be summarized as follows:
• Nobles (group 1):  The most powerful ones, as in the Middle 
Ages, they are responsible for the daily essential management 
tasks, in this case, the policy implementation process. They 
hold the highest DAS in the intermediate positions, usually 
perform a variety of work activities, have considerable mana-
gement background, and are well educated, influential and 
very connected.
• Knighs (group 2):  This type of mid-level bureaucrats, as 
the Knights in the feudal system, is composed by the civil 
service’s elite – part of permanent career in the top posts and 
well educated. Nevertheless, without the Nobles’s power and 
influence. They are mostly advisors and averagely connected 
and busy with the public sector’s activities.
• Vassals (group 3): Although these MLBs are seldom a repre-
sentative of the elite, different from the Nobels and Knights, 
which can be perceived by their lower commissioned posi-
tions and because they do not work in the Federal District, 
the Vassals type overcome it with high education level and 
experience in government and team management. As well 
as in the Middle Ages, Vassals perform, usually, relevant 
management responsibilities in decentralized units (military 
support and mutual protection back then). Therefore, they are 
influential in the policy decision process and very connected 
and multitasking. 
• Merchants (group 4): this mid-level bureaucrats differ 
completely from the other types because they are all advisors 
and without a permanent link with the civil service, exactly 
like the Merchants during the feudalism period, since this 
class was typically nomadic people established in a particular 
setting. The MLBs Merchants are young with low experience 
and educational level, subsequently, not influential and less 
connected and busy.
• Farmers (group 5): the largest type of mid-level bureaucrats, 
as the small rural owners in the intermediate layer of Middle 
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Ages social structure, is not influential, less educated and 
connected. The totality of them works in executive activities 
and is very concentrated in the lowest commissioned posi-
tions, however, spread all over the Brazilian states.
Final Remarks
This paper is a fruitful analysis, and further investigation of a 
comprehensive research started in 2014 andintended to deepen 
the understanding of mid-level bureaucrats of the Brazilian federal 
government (Enap, 2014; Cavalcante and Lotta, 2015). Exactly to 
address one of the issues raised by this research agenda, the MLBs 
heterogeneity, this inquiry’s goals are not only to prove how diverse 
the mid-level bureaucrats are, but mainly to make progress at explo-
ring in which extent they differ. 
As shown in the theoretical section, typologies are not a trivial 
exercise in this field of study. The literature, however, covers a subs-
tantial number of researches focused on explaining how bureau-
crats are a complex and unlike subject. Besides, they also focus on 
how advancing the comprehensive knowledge of them can help 
to investigate their impacts on policymaking and on social and 
economic development.
Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature that does not cover 
the mid-level bureaucrats approach, which was showed in the 
present paper. MLBs are recognized as actors who play specific and 
important roles in policymaking as they connect different levels 
of bureaucrats and translate the formulation to implementation 
and vice versa. Then, this paper proposes an original typology of 
bureaucrats situated in intermediate layer of the civil service struc-
ture, consists in a deliberated effort to fill this gap. To do so, relying 
on a resourceful database highly representative of the Brazilian 
MLB, a sophisticated analytical strategies was employed, prima-
rily, complete-linkage clustering to analyze simple and composite 
indicators regarding important bureaucracy’s dimensions, such as 
profile, job attachment, professional background and performance. 
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The empirical results were quite interesting. The cluster analysis 
provided five distinguished groups or types that were used to sort in 
a bureaucrat hierarchical structure. In order to facilitate these types’ 
description, they were compared to well-known social classes of the 
Middle Ages. This analogy served merely as an illustrative exercise 
that helped to highlight the main characteristics of MLB’s typology. 
First, despite the heterogeneity, in general, this specific segment 
of the civil service is well educated with years of public sector and 
management’s experience, which conflicts with the common sense. 
Besides, the empirical evidence also confirms the presence of meri-
tocratic mechanisms in the Brazilian federal government, already 
highlighted in the literature (IADB, 2006; Evans and Rauch, 2014; 
Cavalcante and Lotta, 2015; Lopez, 2015), since professional back-
ground and formal education have positive relation with commis-
sioned position appointments. 
Additionally, the typology demonstrated the existence of an elite 
of MLBs - nobles, vassals and knights; however, even inside this 
prominent segment there is stratification. Considering the perfor-
mance dimensions (influence, relationship and activities), nobles 
are at the top, followed by vassals and knights, in this particular 
order. In the pyramid basis, the clusters analysis showed two types 
- merchants and farmers - that are very far from the elite, mostly 
because they have, overall, less qualification and resources. 
The evidences are, in fact, interesting and unique, but why is 
this typology important? The assumption that bureaucracy is a 
relevant player in the policymaking process is already a consensus; 
notwithstanding, we strongly believe that it is not enough both for 
theoretical and practical purposes. In proving and describing that 
bureaucracy, especially the mid-level, must not be seem as a simple 
analytical construction, the MLB’s typology contributes to accurate 
the understanding of their behaviour and performance inside the 
public sector. In this sense, the research’s results help scholars and, 
above all, the government to formulate different policies to select, 
train and foster better performance accordingly to each type of 
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bureaucrat and based on precise knowledge of their characteristics 
and skills.
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APPENDIX 1 – Mid-level Bureaucrat’s relationship and 
activities indexes
In this section  the methodology for the preparation of the 
synthetic Index of MLB Relationships (IBR) and Activities (IBA) are 
presented. Initially, an original frame was chosen, the factors that 
best represent the analyzed phenomenon. In this case, the frequency 
of bureaucrat’s interaction with governmental and non-gover-
nmental players and the frequency of activities’ performed in a 
yearlong. The second step involves the selection of the primary data 
that had been transformed to allow comparisons (OCDE, 2008). 
The frequencies of responses were converted into numbers from 
two survey questions - Always (5); Often (4); Sometimes (3); Rarely 
(2) and Never (1). 
The relationship question is: thinking about the work routine of 
your current position (consider the last year), indicate how often you 
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interact (negotiate, send and receive orders, resolve, request informa-
tion, etc.) with others. Table 2 shows the set of players/institutions 
(IRB primary indicators).  
The activity question is: thinking about your work routine in this 
current position (consider the last 12 months), indicate how often you 
perform the following activities, listed in the table 3.
In the next step, the Principal Component Analysis method 
(PCA) was employed, a type of factor analysis, which, in short, 
applies to the identification of factors that objectively point to the 
aggregation and reduction of a number of measures. The method 
provides reduced loss of explanatory power of the original data 
and a lesser degree of subjectivity of the researcher (Hair et al., 
2005). The main purpose is to create new variables that are linear 
combinations of the primary variables. Thus, unlike the arbitrary 
definition of weights, the methodology takes advantage of the 
correlation between indicators and creates an index corresponding 
to a weighted average of these variables.
Once built, the indexes were transformed, aiming at normali-
zation of its values within the 0 - 100 range. Thus, the following 
formula was used:
IS Xi X
X Xi
X 






 
min
max min
100 0 100
Where,
IS = Synthetic Index
X i = Observed Index
X min = Minimum value 
X max = Maximum value
Finally, Table 2 and 3 also include the percentage variation of 
the first component and the respective factor loadings used for the 
calculation of indexes, separated by the dimension indicators:
Pedro L. C. Cavalcante, Gabriela S. Lotta e Erika M. K. Yamada220
Table 2. List of variables and loadings of the first component
 Dimension Primary Indicator Eigenvalue
Index of MLB Relationships (IBR)
Intra-organizational
Superiors
1.4
Subordinates
Colleagues of the same 
hierarchical level
Inter-government
Other bodies (except Civil Office)
2.74
Civil Office
Politicians
Control bodies (General 
Comptroller of the Union, 
Federal Court of Accounts)
Judiciary bodies
States and municipalities
Non-governmental
International organizations
2.45Media
Civil society
Source: Authors, based on Mid-level Bureaucrats Surveys.
Table 3. List of variables and loading of the first component
 Primary Indicator Eigenvalue
Index of MLB 
Activities (IBA)
Contacts and individual conversations (e.g. phone calls, clearances, etc.)
3,55
Participate in meetings with internal agency staff
Attend meetings with external parties
Provide or validate data for of systems information
Conduct research and studies (reading, searching for information, consulting experts)
Business Travel
Produce and validate internal documents (e.g. technical opi-
nion, reports, plans, spreadsheets and presentations)
Produce and validate normative documents (e.g. drafts of de-
cree resolutions or ordinance or regulation)
Produce and validate external circulation of documents (e.g. re-
leases, flyers, brochures and manuals)
Organize or participate in events (conferences, lectures and congresses)
Source: Authors, based on Mid-level Bureaucrats Surveys.
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APPENDIX 2 – Gower’s coefficient
Gower index is a similarity coefficient that simultaneously 
combines several types of variables (qualitative and quantitative). 
To build a dissimilarity matrix for the clustering method the simi-
larity between objects of interest must be calculated. If the variable 
is qualitative, the similarity between variables is calculated by the 
arithmetic mean of the comparisons between variables, which 
can assume two values, zero (when there is disagreement between 
objects) and one (when there is agreement between the objects); 
if the variable is continuous, the similarity is given by the ratio 
between the deviation and the maximum deviation from other 
values of other variables. Thus, the coefficient is given as follows:
Sij
w s
s
Sk kk
p
kk
p if   




1
1
0 1, ,
Where,
Wk: flexible element (Kronecker delta)
Sk: similarity (qualitative or quantitative)
Sij: similarity between objects i and j.
p: number of variables.
If the value is close to one, it means that the two objects do not 
differ in characteristics, while if the value is close to zero, then, the 
two objects are very different.
Abstract
The paper’s main goal is to present an original typology of bureaucrats, 
situated in intermediate layer of the civil service structure. This specific 
set of players, the mid-level bureaucrat (MLB), is seen as a strategic 
group, primarily, because of its connection role and position between 
the top officials and the policy executors. Despite their relevance and 
well-known heterogeneity, few studies have explored this diversity and 
the effects in the policymaking. In order to fulfill this gap and deepen the 
understanding of the MLBs, this article proposes a typology that includes 
crucial dimensions, such as profile, background and performance, and, 
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thus, empirically confirms the heterogeneity assumption in the Brazilian 
federal civil service.
Keywords: mid-level bureaucrat; typology; policymaking; Brazil.
Resumo
O principal objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma tipologia original de 
burocratas situados no nível intermediário da estrutura do serviço público. 
Esse conjunto específico de atores, os burocratas de médio escalão (BME), 
é visto como um grupo estratégico em função do seu papel de ligação 
e posição entre o alto escalão e os executores das políticas. Apesar de 
sua relevância e da reconhecida heterogeneidade, poucos estudos têm 
essa diversidade e efeitos no policymaking. Para cobrir esta lacuna e 
aprofundar na compreensão dos BMEs, este artigo propõe uma tipologia 
que inclui importantes dimensões, como perfil, trajetórias e desempenho, 
e assim, confirma empiricamente o pressuposto da heterogeneidade no 
serviço público federal brasileiro. 
Palavras-chave: burocrata de médio escalão; tipologia; formulação e 
implementação de políticas públicas; Brasil.
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